JOHN BLOOMBERG-RISSMAN
Reviews
Zen by Jessica Smith
(Lulu eBook (PDF), 2011)
The cover of Zen is important, so I reproduce it
here:
If
the cover can be trusted, it is some sort of rewrite of Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra; what kind, we don’t know yet.
Opening
the volume, we find: 238 apparently blank pages. Or we would, if we printed out
the PDF. I think immediately of other works of erasure, such as Ronald
Johnson’s Radi os, Jen Bervin’s Nets, Rauschenberg’s Erased De Kooning, etc. And ask, is
blankness the same as “erasedness”? Are erased pages blank?
But
before I think too hard about the tradition of such work, I flash: blank/erased
pages, a title that can resolve to … zen … clever total rewrite / reworking /
negating of the concept of the übermensch
… aha.
But
is that it? Somehow I’m not comfortable leaving it at that. Then I realize why.
Besides the fact that it feels too simple, the cover image: Is that Nietzsche
sitting on what appears to be the corpse of a horse? How odd. As Béla Tarr
tells the most famous story from Nietzsche’s biography at the beginning of his film
The Turin Horse, “In Turin on 3rd
January, 1889, Friedrich Nietzsche steps out of the doorway of number six, Via
Carlo Alberto. Not far from him, the driver of a hansom cab is having trouble
with a stubborn horse. Despite all his urging, the horse refuses to move,
whereupon the driver loses his patience and takes his whip to it. Nietzsche
comes up to the throng and puts an end to the brutal scene, throwing his arms
around the horse’s neck, sobbing. His landlord takes him home, he lies
motionless and silent for two days on a divan until he mutters the obligatory
last words, and lives for another ten years, silent and demented, cared for by
his mother and sisters. We do not know what happened to the horse.”
But
we can be pretty sure Nietzsche never sat on it …
In
some ways the picture performs the function of a koan. But, in spite of the way
Smith’s book is commonly called Zen,
it appears from a continued careful perusal of the cover, that the real title
is Z:En. Zen and not zen. A koan and
not a koan …
Of
course, once we pass beyond the cover, and into the text, I can’t help but
think of Craig Dworkin’s No Medium, which
is a study of “works that are blank, erased, clear, or silent”. It turns out
that Dworkin has a long footnote that in part discusses Smith’s book. After
discussing Marcel Broodthaers’ edition of Baudelaire’s Pauvre Belgique!, in which Broodthaers blanks out Baudelaire’s
dissing of Belgium, he assimilates Zen/Z:En
to Broodthaers' tradition of rebuke, in this case of the genre of erasure (as a reductio ad absurdam), and, surprisingly,
finds her choice of title arbitrary (“Why the distributed ‘zen’, rather than
‘rat’, say?”). This last is not a rhetorical device, because he never does go
on to figure out why this book is not called Rat (I don’t claim that Smith couldn’t have called the book Rat, I just claim that it would have
been a very different book, and not the one in question). He concludes his
discussion of Zen/Z:En by remarking
on the “bite” of her “cynicism”, and “the possibility of a more sincere reading
of the blank pages in relation to the title”; I am not very interested here
(frankly, I am not very interested at all) in the cynicism, which relates to
erasure as a genre (because I am not very interested in genre, really), tho I
will enthusiastically endorse the possibility of the latter. And hope to, at
least in part, provide a sincere reading here.
What
if we assume for a moment that Smith means / intends, every aspect of her text?
What if we assume that we must read this translation of Zarasthustra with as
much sincerity” as we must read any other translation, not to mention the German
text?
(More
questions: did she erase the German? The cover is German, but how much does
that signify? Did she erase a translation? Is this a translation of a
translation?)
I
am not asserting here that I have mastered the nuances of erasedness, or even
of this particular collection of erasednesses. Quite the opposite. You will
find more questions than answers here. But I am asserting that these erasednesses
seme:
Asking whether
signs involve sound images like tsupu, or whether they come to
mean through events like a palm crashing down, or whether their sense emerges
in some more systemic and distributed manner, like the interrelated network of
words printed on the pages that make up this book, might encourage us to think
about signs in terms of the differences in their tangible qualities. But signs
are more than things. They don't squarely reside in sounds, events, or words.
Nor are they exactly in bodies or even minds. They can't be precisely located
in this way because they are ongoing relational processes. Their sensuous
qualities are only one part of the dynamic through which they come to be, to
grow, and to have effects in the world.
In other words
signs are alive. A crashing palm tree-taken as sign-is alive insofar as it can
grow. It is alive insofar as it will come to be interpreted by a subsequent
sign in a semiotic chain that extends into the possible future.
The startled monkey's jump to a higher
perch is a part of this living semiotic chain. It is what Peirce called an
"interpretant," a new sign that interprets the way in which a prior
sign relates to its object. Interpretants can be further specified through an
ongoing process of sign production and interpretation that increasingly
captures something about the world and increasingly orients an interpreting
self toward this aboutness. Semiosis is the name for this living sign process
through which one thought gives rise to another, which in turn gives rise to
another, and so on, into the potential future. It captures the way in which
living signs are not just in the here and now but also in the realm of the
possible.
Although
semiosis is something more than mechanical efficiency, thinking is not just
confined to some separate realm of ideas. A sign has an effect, and this,
precisely, is what an interpretant is. It is the "proper significate
effect that the sign produces" (CP 5.475). The monkey's jump, sparked by
her reaction to a crashing palm, amounts to an interpretant of a prior sign of
danger. It makes visible an energetic component that is characteristic of all
sign processes, even those that might seem purely "mental." Although
semiosis is something more than energetics and materiality, all sign processes
eventually "do things" in the world, and this is an important part of
what makes them alive.
Signs don't
come from the mind. Rather, it is the other way around. What we call mind, or
self, is a product of semiosis. That "somebody," human or nonhuman,
who takes the crashing palm to be significant is a "self that is just
coming into life in the flow of time" (CP 5.421) by virtue of the ways in
which she comes to be a locus-however ephemeral-for the
"interpretance" of this sign and many others like it. In fact, Peirce
coined the cumbersome term interpretant to avoid the
"homunculus fallacy" (see Deacon 2012: 48) of seeing a self as a sort
of black box (a little person inside us, a homunculus) who would be the
interpreter of those signs but not herself the product of those signs. Selves,
human or nonhuman, simple or complex, are outcomes of semiosis as well as the
starting points for new sign interpretation whose outcome will be a future
self. They are waypoints in a semiotic process.
(Eduardo Kohn,
How Forests Think)
And
with that, I am going to pause a moment and ask the author some questions:
1)
Is the name of this book Zen or Z:En or both or neither? And how did you
come to choose that title?
Jessica
Smith: “Zen (which is how I think of it, although it is also at the
same time certainly not simply Zen, but Z:En, an
already hinged text) stemmed from a discussion with my former partner, Martin Hägglund,
who is a Derrida scholar. I remember discussing Nietzsche’s yes and Derrida's
“opening” and their desire for the future, which seems opposed to (what I know
of) the Buddhist concept of nirvana, which seems nihilistic. That is the
opposite of Nietzsche, who far from wanting everything to be erased, wants to
make love to that night demon who offers him eternal return.”
2)
Can you tell us something about the cover image? (Provenance, etc. Anything you
want)
JS:
The cover image-- I don’t remember how I found it-- is not of Nietzsche, though
it is intended to represent the scene you describe, where he ostensibly breaks
down over the beating of a work horse. As I told Dworkin, at the time
there were a lot of erasure poems in the literary scene so this is a reference
to “beating a dead horse,” and the internal completely erased pages were
intended to be the last stop of erasure (a form which I now embrace, but at the
time I felt like Dworkin recently at AWP, “I hope I never see another
erasure poem again”). At the same time, there’s some deep pathos in that image,
and its use is not accidental. Nietzsche—“Why I am so clever” Nietzsche--
breaks, forever, while witnessing violence against an animal. And then
everything happens to Nietzsche in those “blank” ten years: in the blank space
of his silence, his sister determines his image for the next fifty years. With
these tools, the context of the cover, how does one read those 238 pages?
Blankness certainly isn’t meaningless-- the blank space of the page is never
weightless.
3)
Is there anything above you disagree with? Anything you’d like to comment on /
argue with / correct?
JS:
I love that you call Zen a koan and perhaps this is both its
irony and its potential power.
OK.
There are a few points or comments or whatever that Smith makes to which I want
to respond, because they relate to how I read this book.
First:
“I remember discussing Nietzsche’s yes and Derrida's “opening” and their desire
for the future, which seems opposed to (what I know of) the Buddhist concept of
nirvana, which seems nihilistic. That is the opposite of Nietzsche, who far
from wanting everything to be erased, wants to make love to that night demon
who offers him eternal return.” Smith and I have very different concepts of
“nirvana”. As best I understand it, an enlightened person “carries water, chops
wood.” There seems nothing nihilistic about this. Therefore I don’t read Zen/Z:En as contradiction of Zarathustra, so much as of a sublation
of it. Erasure is not annihilation. Especially when a trace (the cover) (the
enlightened person??) is left. Is this book what happens when the eternal
return meets non-returning? When a dream of the future meets the is? I’ll come
back to this.
Second:
“As I told Dworkin, at the time there were a lot of erasure poems in the
literary scene so this is a reference to “beating a dead horse,” and the
internal completely erased pages were intended to be the last stop of erasure
(a form which I now embrace, but at the time I felt like Dworkin recently at AWP, “I
hope I never see another erasure poem again”).” I should again make it explicit
that the erasure of a genre (by completing it, perhaps) is of no interest to me
here. That’s a whole other conversation.
Third:
“And then everything happens to Nietzsche in those “blank” ten years: in the
blank space of his silence, his sister determines his image for the next fifty
years. With these tools, the context of the cover, how does one read those 238
pages?” With this comment, Smith appears to relate her blanking of Zarathustra to Nietzsche’s biographical
erasure/blankness/(mis)interpretation. Thus (authorial-intention-wise), it
would seem that at least in part the blank pages that make up Zen/Z:En are pretty purely
representational. Which, besides indicating that, for Smith, blankness can
perform a number of functions simultaneously, leads me to ask: Is one of the
functions that she wishes to perform akin to that performed by Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche’s? I would answer: in part, at
least, very possibly yes. Among the other things that erasure does, these
blanked/erased pages can be seen to interpret Nietzsche’s text.
Fourth:
“Blankness certainly isn’t meaningless-- the blank space of the page is never
weightless.” This is certainly my contention.
Fifth:
“I love that you call Zen a koan and perhaps this is both its
irony and its potential power.” Given that, perhaps I should to leave the
relationship between the Nietzsche’s title and text and Smith’s title and text
as just that, a koan. But I’m not. I’m going to interpret it. No. I’m going to
offer one possible interpretation. Not because I believe that it is the interpretation, the key to what is going on here, but as an example rather, of how
erasure is never complete, and how even apparent blankness can seme.
The
Verso Books blurb for Malcolm Bull’s Anti-Nietzsche
(2011) reads:
Nietzsche, the philosopher seemingly
opposed to everyone, has met with remarkably little opposition himself. He
remains what he wanted to be— the limit-philosopher of a modernity that never
ends. In this provocative, sometimes disturbing book, Bull argues that merely
to reject Nietzsche is not to escape his lure. He seduces by appealing to our
desire for victory, our creativity, our humanity. Only by ‘reading like a
loser’ and failing to live up to his ideals can we move beyond Nietzsche to a
still more radical revaluation of all values—a subhumanism that expands the
boundaries of society until we are left with less than nothing in common.
Anti-Nietzsche is a subtle and subversive engagement with Nietzsche and his twentieth-century interpreters—Heidegger, Vattimo, Nancy, and Agamben. Written with economy and clarity, it shows how a politics of failure might change what it means to be human.
Anti-Nietzsche is a subtle and subversive engagement with Nietzsche and his twentieth-century interpreters—Heidegger, Vattimo, Nancy, and Agamben. Written with economy and clarity, it shows how a politics of failure might change what it means to be human.
First,
note the dates of these books. Smith’s was published two years before Bull’s.
Therefore one can be pretty sure that Zen/Z:En
is not in the Bull “tradition”. Yet I propose that the latter can be fruitfully
read thru Bull’s notion of reading like a “loser”. And then some. I mean, let’s
start with Bull. And then. Bull:
Nietzsche repeatedly refers to Supermen
as being a different species: ‘I write for a species of man that does not yet
exist: for “the masters of the earth.” He was not speaking metaphorically,
either. He hoped that the new species might be created through selective
breeding, and noted the practical possibility of ‘international racial unions
whose task will be to rear the master race, the “future masters of the earth.”’
According to Nietzsche, it follows from
this that, relative to the Supermen, ordinary mortals will have no rights
whatsoever. …
Simply
put, I am arguing that it is possible to say that if one were to erase
everything in Zarathustra NOT aimed at “losers”, there just might not be much
left.
Now,
I know that Bull’s reading is
controversial, and my point here is not to insist on it. I am not arguing that
he has got Nietzsche absolutely right. I am arguing, rather, that his reading
has at least some validity, and that it is possible to read Smith thru this
lens. As Keith Ansell-Pearson writes in a review of Anti-Nietzsche at http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/web/the-future-is-subhuman
Radical Philosophy, “For Bull
although there have been an abundance of post-Nietzscheans keen to appropriate
Nietzsche for their own agendas, there have been few post- Nietzschean
anti-Nietzscheans – ‘critics whose response is designed not to prevent us from
getting to Nietzsche, but to enable us to get over him’.”
Let
us assume for a moment that there is value in getting over Nietzsche, or at
least certain aspects of him, aspects perhaps best exemplified by Zarathustra
and the whole Superman/masters of the earth/no rights for the rest of us thing.
What are our options? We can read like a loser. OK. But that’s not getting over
Nietzsche, that’s getting caught in a dialectical relationship with him. The
very opposite of getting over.
How
to sublate this dialectic? (I said I would return to this). Well, one way is thru
the meditative techniques associated with zen (which, as I have indicated
above, is in no way nihilism or passive or …). Or should I say Zen/Z:En? Note that this goes further
than Bull does, at least according to the Verso blurb, which indicates that in
his reading we would be left with “a subhumanism that expands the boundaries of
society until we are left with less than nothing in common.” In my opinion, it
is good to go further than that. who wants a world in which “we are left with
less than nothing in common”? That is not the world of zen practice, which, at
least in its monastic form, is utterly communal as well as individual, tho, as
enlightenment approaches, the borders between communal and individual can be
said to flicker and go out, at least in a practical sense. Or what else might
it mean to be a bodhisattva? These are Dōgen’s Sixteen Bodhisattva Precepts
(John Daido Loori translation). They applied to lay practitioners as well as to
monks:
The
Three Treasures
- Taking
refuge in the Buddha
- Taking
refuge in the Dharma
- Taking
refuge in the Sangha
The
Three Pure Precepts
- Do not
create Evil
- Practice
Good
- Actualize
Good For Others
The
Ten Grave Precepts
- Affirm
life – Do not kill
- Be giving
– Do not steal
- Honor the
body – Do not misuse sexuality
- Manifest
truth – Do not lie
- Proceed
clearly – Do not cloud the mind
- See the
perfection – Do not speak of others errors and faults
- Realize
self and other as one – Do not elevate the self and blame others
- Give
generously – Do not be withholding
- Actualize
harmony – Do not be angry
- Experience
the intimacy of things – Do not defile the Three Treasures
You
will recall Smith saying, “I remember discussing Nietzsche’s yes and Derrida's
“opening” and their desire for the future …” Well, we have now sublated Nietzsche’s
yes (which, as we have seen, may not be a yes for you, or a yes for me …) and
arrived at a larger yes, and we have walked thru Derrida’s opening, into a
possible future of bodhisattvas. Who neither win nor lose.
But
I want to return once more to the picture on the cover. Let’s think for a
minute about that cover image. It’s still just a puzzling. I am choosing here
to read it as Nietzsche-Boddhisattva. Or not. This is a koan to gnaw on. But
humor me. What does it say about the future? Perhaps that it will mean
beginning again and again and again, failing again and again and again, beginning
again and again and again … “Experience the intimacy of things – Do not defile
the Three Treasures” … face not an
eternal return but an exquisitely engaging undetermined …
Which
is not bad, given that we started with a cover and half a ream of erased pages
…
But
wait! The name of Smith’s book may not be Zen,
but rather Z:En. What does that do to
this reading? How does it change it? Aha! The reading(s) of this erasure, just
like the future, may never end …
*****
John Bloomberg-Rissman has about a year and a half to go on In the House of the Hangman, the third section of his maybe life project called Zeitgeist Spam. The first two volumes have been published: No Sounds of My Own Making (Leafe Press, 2007), and Flux, Clot & Froth (Meritage Press 2010). In addition to his Zeitgeist Spam project, the main other thing on his plate right now is an anthology which he is editing with Jerome Rothenberg, titled Barbaric Vast & Wild: An Anthology of Outside & Subterranean Poetry, due out from Black Widow Press, Autumn 014. He's also learning to play the viola and he blogs at www.johnbr.com (Zeitgeist Spam).
Very engaging piece.
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